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OPINION ANNOUNCING THE JUDGMENT 
OF THE COURT 
 
ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 
 
The sole question presented by this appeal is whether 
restaurants are "dealers" under the Perishable Agricultural 
Commodities Act, 7 U.S.C. S 499a et seq. ("PACA"), and 
therefore subject to its trust provision, 7 U.S.C.S 499e(c). 
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of 
Delaware held that they are, and subsequently granted 
partial summary judgment in favor of the Appellant. The 
United States District Court reversed. We hold that 
restaurants are dealers under the plain language of PACA, 
and we therefore reverse the order of the district court and 
reinstate the order of the bankruptcy court. 
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I. 
 
On April 6, 1995, Magic Restaurants, Inc. and Magic 
American Cafe, Inc. (collectively "Magic")filed voluntary 
bankruptcy petitions in the bankruptcy court for 
reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. 
Magic, directly or through its subsidiaries, owned and 
operated fifteen restaurants in the Washington, D.C. and 
New York City metropolitan areas. These restaurants 
generated $20 million in sales revenues in a six month 
period in 1995-96. Magic purchased fresh fruits and 
vegetables from Bowie Produce Co., Inc. ("Bowie"), which it 
processed into food items, including salads or hamburger 
trimmings, and sold to its restaurant customers. At the 
time Magic filed for bankruptcy in April 1995, it owed 
Bowie $98,983.74 for these produce purchases. 
 Bowie commenced an adversarial proceeding in the 
bankruptcy court to recover full payment from Magic on the 
ground that the proceeds from the produce Magic had 
purchased were trust funds under Section 5(c) of PACA, 7 
U.S.C. S 499e(c). Magic moved for summary judgment on 
the ground that as a restaurant, it was not a "dealer," and 
was therefore not subject to PACA's trust provision. By 
memorandum opinion and order dated June 18, 1996, the 
bankruptcy court denied Magic's motion and held that 
Magic was a "dealer" under the plain language of PACA. On 
January 15, 1997, the bankruptcy court granted partial 
summary judgment for Bowie, awarding it $93,173.29 in 
trust proceeds. 
 
Magic appealed the bankruptcy court's ruling to the 
district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 158(a). The district 
court reversed the bankruptcy court by memorandum 
opinion and order dated January 6, 1999, holding that 
Magic was not a "dealer" under PACA and therefore was not 
subject to its trust provision. This timely appeal followed. 
 
II. 
 
A. Statutory Background. 
 
Congress enacted PACA in 1930 "to promote fair trading 
practices in the marketing of perishable agricultural 
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commodities, largely fruits and vegetables." Consumers 
Produce Co., Inc. v. Volante Wholesale Produce, Inc. , 16 F.3d 
1374, 1377-78 (3d Cir. 1994). PACA was " `designed 
primarily for the protection of the producers of perishable 
agricultural products -- most of whom must entrust their 
products to a buyer or commission merchant who may be 
thousands of miles away, and depend for their payment 
upon his business acumen and fair dealing.' " In re 
Kornblum & Co., Inc., 81 F.3d 280, 283 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1196, at 2 (1955), reprinted in 1956 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3699, 3701). Producers of perishable 
agricultural goods are in large part dependent upon the 
honesty and scrupulousness of the purchaser or consignee 
who geographically may be far removed. To provide 
producers with some protection, Congress fortified the 
original PACA with two primary weapons. First, it 
prohibited certain conduct by "commission merchants," 
"brokers," or "dealers." 7 U.S.C. S 499b. Failure to abide by 
these prohibitions rendered the "commission merchant, 
dealer, or broker . . . liable to the person or persons injured 
thereby for the full amount of damages . . . sustained in 
consequence of such violation." Id. SS 499e(a) & 499e(b). 
Second, PACA established a mandatory licensing scheme, 
under the supervision of the Secretary of Agriculture, for 
any "person" carrying on "the business of a commission 
merchant, dealer, or broker." Id. S 499c. The Secretary was 
given the power to refuse, suspend, or terminate licenses 
on numerous grounds, including conduct prohibited under 
S 499b. See 7 U.S.C. SS 499c, 499d, 499h. Any person 
doing business without the required license was subject to 
monetary penalties. Id. S 499c(a). 
 
PACA in its original form therefore protected produce 
growers and producers, and worked to make "the marketing 
of perishable agricultural commodities more orderly and 
efficient." Hull Co. v. Hauser's Foods, Inc., 924 F.2d 777, 
779 (8th Cir. 1991). Even with the passage of a half-century 
after its initial enactment, Congress, in 1984, determined 
that prevalent financing practices in the perishable 
agricultural commodities industry were placing the industry 
as a whole, including produce sellers, in jeopardy. It 
responded by amending PACA, explaining: 
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       It is hereby found that a burden on commerce in 
       perishable agricultural commodities is caused by 
       financing arrangements under which commission 
 
       merchants, dealers, or brokers, who have not made 
       payment for perishable agricultural commodities 
       purchased, contracted to be purchased, or otherwise 
       handled by them on behalf of another person, 
       encumber or give lenders a security interest in, such 
       commodities, or on inventories of food or other 
       products derived from such commodities, and any 
       receivables or proceeds from the sale of such 
       commodities or products, and that such arrangements 
       are contrary to the public interest. . . . 
 
7 U.S.C. S 499e(c)(1).1 
 
In order to "remedy such burden on commerce in 
perishable agricultural commodities and to protect the 
public interest," id., Congress "increase[d] the legal 
protection for unpaid sellers and suppliers of perishable 
agricultural commodities until full payment of sums due 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The legislative history of the 1984 PACA amendments further explains 
the problem Congress intended to address: 
 
        Sellers of agricultural commodities are often located thousands of 
       miles from their customers. Sales transactions must be made 
       quickly or they are not made at all . . . . Under such conditions, 
it 
       is often difficult to make credit checks, conditional sales 
       agreements, and take other traditional safeguards. 
 
       * * * 
 
        Many [buyers], in the ordinary course of their business 
       transactions, operate on bank loans secured by [their] inventories, 
       proceeds or assigned receivables from sales of perishable 
       agricultural commodities, giving the lender a secured position in 
the 
       case of insolvency. Under present law, sellers of fresh fruits and 
       vegetables are unsecured creditors and receive little protection in 
       any suit for recovery of damages where a buyer has failed to make 
       payment as required by the contract. 
 
        In recent years, produce sellers have been subjected to increased 
       instances of buyers failure to pay and slow payments. 
 
H.R. Rep. No. 98-543, at 3 (1983), reprinted in  1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 405, 
406. 
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have been received by them," H.R. Rep. No. 98-543, at 3 
(1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 405, 406 (emphasis 
added), by enacting 7 U.S.C. S 499e(c). This provision 
imposes a floating, non-segregated trust on produce buyers 
for the benefit of unpaid produce suppliers.2 The corpus of 
this trust is comprised of (1) the perishable agricultural 
commodities purchased from these suppliers, (2) all 
inventories of food or other products derived from the 
perishable agricultural commodities, and (3) receivables or 
proceeds from the sale of such commodities or products. 7 
U.S.C. S 499e(c)(2). The statutory trustee is the delinquent 
"commission merchant, dealer, or broker." Id. The unpaid 
supplier loses the benefits of the trust unless written notice 
of intent to preserve the trust is given to the trustee within 
thirty calendar days after payment must be made. Id. 
S 499e(c)(3). In essence, PACA's trust provision gives the 
unpaid supplier an interest in the trust corpus superior to 
the interest of any other lien or secured creditor. See 
Consumers Produce, 16 F.3d at 1379; In re W.L. Bradley 
Co., Inc., 75 B.R. 505, 509 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (quoting 
In re Prange Foods, Corp., 63 B.R. 211, 214 (Bankr. W.D. 
Mich. 1986)). 
 
B. The District Court's Decision. 
 
Bowie's appeal hinges on its contention that Magic is a 
"dealer" under PACA.3 If Bowie is correct, it has priority to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 2. The trust provision states, in relevant part: 
 
       Perishable agricultural commodities received by a commission 
       merchant, dealer, or broker in all transactions, and all 
inventories 
 
       of food or other products derived from perishable agricultural 
       commodities, and any receivables or proceeds from the sale of such 
       commodities or products, shall be held by such commission 
       merchant, dealer, or broker in trust for the benefit of all unpaid 
       suppliers or sellers of such commodities or agents involved in the 
       transaction, until full payment of the sums owing in connection 
with 
 
       such transactions has been received by such unpaid suppliers, 
       sellers, or agents. . . . 
 
7 U.S.C. S 499e(c)(2). 
 
3. Bowie did not contend in the bankruptcy court or the district court 
and does not contend now that Magic is a "commission merchant" or a 
"broker." 
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certain of Magic's assets as the beneficiary of PACA's 
statutorily imposed trust. PACA defines the term"dealer" as 
"any person engaged in the business of buying or selling in 
wholesale or jobbing quantities, as defined by the 
Secretary, any perishable agricultural commodity in 
 
interstate or foreign commerce . . . ." 7 U.S.C.S 499a(b)(6). 
PACA also provides three exceptions to this definition: 
 
       (A) no producer shall be considered as a "deale r" in 
       respect to sales of any such commodity of his own 
       raising; 
 
       (B) no person buying any such commodity solely for 
       sale at retail shall be considered as a "dealer" until the 
       invoice cost of his purchases of perishable agricultural 
       commodities in any calendar year are in excess of 
       $230,000; and 
 
       (C) no person buying any commodity other than 
       potatoes for canning and/or processing within the 
       State where grown shall be considered a "dealer" 
       whether or not the canned or processed product is to 
       be shipped in interstate or foreign commerce, unless 
       such product is frozen or packed in ice, or consists of 
       cherries in brine . . . . 
 
Id. Finally, this provision notes that "[a]ny person not 
considered as a `dealer' under clauses (A), (B), and (C) may 
elect to secure a license under the provisions of section 
499c of this title, and in such case and while the license is 
in effect such person shall be considered as a `dealer'." 
Magic has never secured such a license, and contends that 
no restaurant has done so. 
 
The parties do not dispute that Magic purchases 
"wholesale or jobbing quantities" of perishable agricultural 
commodities in interstate commerce.4 Bowie therefore 
contends that, based on the plain language of the statute, 
Magic is a "dealer" and is subject to the trust. The 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Regulations promulgated by the United States Department of 
Agriculture ("USDA") define "wholesale or jobbing quantities" as 
"aggregate quantities of all types of produce totaling one ton (2,000 
pounds) or more in weight in any day shipped, received, or contracted to 
be shipped or received." 7 C.F.R. S 46.2(x). 
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bankruptcy court agreed, but the district court reversed. 
The court held that PACA "is silent on the issue of whether 
restaurants qualify as `dealers,' " and therefore, "Congress 
has not spoken directly to the issue of PACA's applicability 
to restaurants." (A.7). Thus, the district court proceeded to 
consider regulations promulgated by the USDA under its 
authority to administer PACA. See 7 U.S.C.S 499o. 
 
These USDA regulations define "dealer" as: 
 
       any person engaged in the business of buying or selling 
       in wholesale or jobbing quantities in commerce and 
       includes: 
 
        (1) Jobbers, distributors and other wholesaler s; 
 
        (2) Retailers, when the invoice cost of all pu rchases 
       of produce exceeds $230,000 during a calendar year. 
       In computing dollar volume, all purchases of fresh and 
       frozen fruits and vegetables are to be counted, without 
       regard to quantity involved in a transaction or whether 
       the transaction was intrastate, interstate or foreign 
       commerce; 
 
        (3) Growers who market produce grown by others. 
 
7 C.F.R. S 46.2(m). The district court concluded that under 
this regulation, in order to be a "dealer" an entity had to fall 
into one of the categories enumerated in 7 C.F.R. 
S 46.2(m)(1), (2), or (3). The court determined that the only 
possible category a restaurant such as Magic could fall into 
was that of "retailers" under 7 C.F.R. S 46.2(m)(2), but 
concluded that restaurants such as Magic were consumers, 
not retailers. Accordingly, the district court held that under 
this USDA regulation, Magic was not a dealer. 
 
The court found support for this conclusion in two 
additional sources. First, in 1996, USDA amended its 
regulatory definition of "fresh fruits and vegetables," 7 
C.F.R. S 46.2(u), to include oil-blanched frozen fruits and 
vegetables, thereby bringing such produce within PACA's 
reach. In its statement accompanying publication of the 
final rule, USDA described a comment it received from a 
representative of a major restaurant chain voicing its 
concern that the rule change "might bring restaurants 
under the jurisdiction of the PACA." Final Rule, 
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"Regulations (Other Than Rules of Practice) Under the 
Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, 1930 (PACA)," 61 
Fed. Reg. 13385, 13386 (Mar. 27, 1996). USDA responded: 
 
       Restaurants traditionally have not been considered 
       subject to the PACA by USDA or Congress unless the 
       buying arm of the restaurant is a separate legal entity, 
       and is buying for and/or reselling the product to 
       another entity. Since restaurants are not subject to the 
       PACA, this change in the regulation will not impact 
       restaurants. 
 
Id. 
 
Second, in 1995, Congress amended PACA. These 
amendments had no bearing on who was and was not 
covered by the statute.5 In the report of the House 
Committee on Agriculture accompanying the 1995 PACA 
Amendments Act, the Committee explained that: 
 
       Section 3 phases out license fees for retailers and 
       grocery wholesalers. It defines the term "retailer" as a 
       person who is a dealer engaged in the business of 
       selling any perishable commodity at retail. 
       Approximately 4,000 retailers are currently estimated 
       to be licensed under PACA. Those businesses such as 
       grocery stores and other like businesses that 
       predominantly serve those consumers purchasing food 
       for consumption at home or off the premises of the 
       retail establishment are considered to be included in 
       the definition of retailer. It is not the intent of the 
       Committee that the definition of retailer be construed 
       to include foodservice establishments such as 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 5. Essentially, the 1995 amendments phased retailers and grocery 
wholesalers out of license fee payment, allowed USDA to adjust license 
fees under its rulemaking authority, "require[d] USDA to receive a 
written complaint before pursuing an investigation, require[d] additional 
USDA investigation notification procedures, increase[d] . . . 
administrative penalties, establishe[d] civil penalties, clarifie[d] the 
status 
of collateral fees and expenses, and clarifie[d] misbranding prohibitions 
. . . ." H.R. Rep. No. 104-207, at 6 (1995), reprinted in 1995 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 
 
453, 453. Other than these changes, the House Committee on 
Agriculture explained, the law remained unaffected. Id. 
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       restaurants, or schools, hospitals and other 
       institutional cafeterias. 
 
H.R. Rep. No. 104-207, at 7 (1995), reprinted in  1995 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 453, 454. 
 
Accordingly, based on this regulatory interpretation and 
legislative history, the district court held that restaurants 
such as Magic are not "dealers" and are therefore not 
subject to PACA's trust provision. 
 
III. 
 
The question of whether a restaurant with extensive 
operations such as Magic is a "dealer" under PACA is a 
purely legal determination. Accordingly, this court exercises 
plenary review over the judgment of the district court. In re 
Reading Co., 115 F.3d 1111, 1124 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
A. The Statutory Language. 
 
In resolving this issue, the first question we must ask is 
whether the plain language of the statute is unambiguous. 
Idahoan Fresh v. Advantage Produce, Inc., 157 F.3d 197, 
202 (3d Cir. 1998). If it is, there is generally no need to look 
to administrative interpretations or to legislative history. 
Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 147-48 (1994); 
Idahoan Fresh, 157 F.3d at 202; West v. Sullivan, 973 F.2d 
179, 185 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 962 (1993). 
If the statute is "silent or ambiguous as to the specific 
issue," and an administrative agency charged with 
administering the statute has devised its own regulatory 
interpretation of the statute, the court must then ask 
"whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible 
construction of the statute." West, 973 F.2d 179 at 185 
(quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Def. 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)). 
 
In the more than half-century since the initial enactment 
of PACA, only three other courts have addressed whether 
restaurants are "dealers" under it. We appear to be the only 
United States Court of Appeals to consider the question. 
Recently, two district courts in California concluded, like 
the bankruptcy court in this case, that restaurants are 
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"dealers" under the plain language of PACA. See Royal 
Foods Co. v. L.R. Holdings, Inc., No. C 99-01609, 1999 WL 
1051978 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 1999); JC Produce, Inc. v. 
Paragon Steakhouse Restaurants, Inc., 70 F. Supp.2d 1119 
(E.D. Cal. 1999). However, in In re Italian Oven, Inc., 207 
B.R. 839 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1997), the bankruptcy court, like 
the district court in this case, held that PACA's definition of 
"dealer" is ambiguous, that the USDA regulation defining 
"dealer" did so to the exclusion of anyone not expressly 
described by the regulation, and that the restaurant debtor 
in that case was not a retailer under this regulation and 
therefore not subject to PACA's trust provision. The Italian 
Oven court considered and expressly rejected the reasoning 
of the bankruptcy court in this case. Id. at 842-43.6 
 
As noted above, USDA, the agency charged with 
administering PACA, has indicated its view that restaurants 
are not "dealers" under that statute. Indeed, that agency's 
consistent practice for seven decades since PACA's 
enactment has been to deny that the statute gives it 
jurisdiction over restaurants.7 Nevertheless, "a reviewing 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. It gave three reasons in support of its holding that PACA's definition 
of "dealer" was ambiguous and resort to administrative materials was 
appropriate. The first reason was that prior to the bankruptcy court's 
decision in this case, there had been no reported decisions dealing with 
whether PACA applies to restaurants, even though the statute had been 
in existence since 1930. Id. at 843. The court's second reason is 
confusing, but appears to have had something to do with PACA's silence 
as to its applicability to restaurants. Id. The third reason was that PACA 
empowered the USDA to administer the statute by enacting regulations. 
Id. at 843-44. For the same reasons discussed herein, the Italian Oven 
court's first two reasons for looking beyond the plain statutory 
definition 
 
of "dealer" are unconvincing to us. Additionally, its third reason is 
irrelevant to an inquiry into the ambiguity of statutory text. 
 
7. This practice is further evidenced by USDA's communications with 
Magic. A July 6, 1995 letter to counsel for Magic from a USDA official 
apparently responsible for license and program review in the PACA 
Branch of USDA's Fruit and Vegetable Division explained that official's 
view that "[r]estaurants are not considered`dealers,' `brokers,' 
`commission merchants' or any other entity whose operations are subject 
to the PACA," and that "[t]he PACA is not applicable to a restaurant that 
does not act as a central distributor for subsidiary restaurants 
irrespective of where it obtains it perishable commodities." (A.16). 
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court should not defer to an agency position which is 
contrary to an intent of Congress expressed in 
unambiguous terms." Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling 
Co., 505 U.S. 469, 476 (1992). 
 
Ultimately, this case turns on whether the statutory 
definition of "dealer" found in PACA is unambiguous with 
respect to its inclusion of restaurants such as Magic. As 
discussed above, PACA states that subject to certain 
exceptions, a dealer is "any person engaged in the business 
of buying or selling in wholesale or jobbing quantities, as 
defined by the Secretary, any perishable agricultural 
commodity in interstate or foreign commerce . . . ." 7 U.S.C. 
S 499a(b)(6). Because "the term `person' includes 
individuals, partnerships, corporations, and associations," 
id. S 499a(b)(1), Magic is a "person" under PACA. 
Furthermore, the parties do not dispute that Magic 
purchased "wholesale or jobbing quantities" of produce, 
which USDA regulations define as "aggregate quantities of 
all types of produce totaling one ton (2,000 pounds) or more 
in weight in any day shipped, received, or contracted to be 
shipped or received." 7 C.F.R. S 46.2(x). Additionally, Magic 
does not contend that it falls within any of the three 
statutory exceptions to PACA's definition of "dealer." See 7 
U.S.C. S 499a(b)(6)(A), (B), and (C). 
 
At oral argument in this case, it was suggested that 
Congress's employment of the words "engaged in the 
business of " in defining the category of"dealers" rendered 
this definition ambiguous, because this language could be 
interpreted to restrict the meaning of "dealer" to include 
only those engaged primarily in the business of buying or 
selling perishable agricultural commodities. However, 
nothing about the ordinary meaning of the words"engaged" 
or "business" indicates that the statutory definition should 
be understood to apply only to those engaged primarily in 
this business. This "engaged in the business of " language 
speaks to the type of business required to invoke 
jurisdiction under PACA, not to the quantity thereof. 
Congress spoke to quantity later in this definition, when it 
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restricted the category of "dealers" to those doing business 
"in wholesale or jobbing quantities."8 
 
There is therefore nothing ambiguous about the 
application of this statutory definition to the facts of this 
case. The district court's conclusion that the definition is 
ambiguous because it does not explicitly state whether 
restaurants are dealers is specious. Because Congress 
chose to define the word "dealer" in broad terms, rather 
than by specifically identifying each entity that falls into 
this category, does not automatically render the definition 
ambiguous. 
 
B. The Statutory Purpose. 
 
Even where the express language of a statute appears 
unambiguous, a court must look beyond that plain 
language where a literal interpretation of this language 
would thwart the purpose of the overall statutory scheme, 
United States v. Jersey Shore Bank, 781 F.2d 974, 977 (3d 
Cir. 1986), aff 'd, 479 U.S. 442 (1987), would lead to an 
absurd result, id., or would otherwise produce a result 
"demonstrably at odds with the intentions of the drafters," 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The interpretation given to the definition of "dealer" in the Packers 
and 
Stockyards Act, 7 U.S.C. S 181 et seq. ("PSA"), lends additional support 
to this conclusion. PACA's trust provision was modeled on that of the 
PSA, and this court has previously observed that authority developed 
under the PSA is persuasive in interpreting PACA's trust. See Consumers 
Produce, 16 F.3d at 1382 n.5. Using language nearly identical to that 
used in PACA, the PSA defines a "dealer" as"any person . . . engaged in 
the business of buying or selling in commerce livestock at a stockyard 
. . . ." Id. S 201(d). The only decision interpreting the PSA's "engaged 
in 
 
the business of " language of which we are aware confirms our 
interpretation of PACA's identical language. See Kelley v. United States, 
202 F.2d 838, 841 (10th Cir. 1953) ("engaged in the business of " 
language cannot be read to mean engaged in the sole business of); see 
also United States v. Perdue Farms, Inc., 680 F.2d 277, 285 (2d Cir. 
1982) (interpreting PSA's nearly identical definition of "live poultry 
dealer," 7 U.S.C. S 218b (repealed 1987), and concluding that "rather 
than focusing upon the absolute amount of packing business or live 
poultry business a firm engaged in, Congress chose to make the USDA's 
jurisdiction dependent upon the activity of the business . . . , no matter 
how small . . . ."). 
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Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 190 (1991) (quoting 
Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 
(1982)). 
 
Nevertheless, it cannot be seriously contended that 
holding that restaurants purchasing perishable agricultural 
commodities in wholesale or jobbing quantities, as defined 
by the Secretary, are "dealers" under PACA is contrary to 
the statute's purpose, absurd, or "demonstrably at odds 
with the intentions of the drafters." There is no clear 
evidence of legislative intent regarding treatment of such 
restaurants at the time the definition of "dealer" was 
originally enacted in 1930. Indeed, the only such evidence 
of legislative intent is the statement contained in the 1995 
House Agriculture Committee report that the Committee did 
not intend that restaurants be included within the 
definition of "retailers" enacted in the 1995 PACA 
Amendments Act. That statement, however, is confined to 
the amendment. This committee report was issued more 
than 30 years after the last time Congress modified the 
definition of "dealer" in any substantial way,9 and dealt with 
issues wholly different from this definition. See supra note 
6. This report language is not something "upon which other 
legislators might have relied in voting for or against" the 
statutory definition of "dealer," and cannot constitute 
evidence of the legislative intent behind that definition. See 
Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 298 (1995). As the 
Supreme Court has observed, "the views of a subsequent 
Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of 
an earlier one." United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 
(1960); see also Pennsylvania Med. Society v. Snider, 29 
F.3d 886, 898 (3d Cir. 1994). We therefore disregard this 
House committee report. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Pub L. No. 87-725, 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2749, substituted "wholesale or 
jobbing quantities" for "carloads." Amendments in 1969, 1978, and 1981 
increase the monetary amount under current section 499a(b)(6)(B) from 
$90,000 to $100,000, $100,000 to $200,000, and $200,000 to $230,000, 
respectively. See Pub. L. No. 97-98, 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. (95 Stat.) 1213, 
1269; Pub. L. No. 95-562, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. (92 Stat.) 2381; Pub. L. No. 
91-107, 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1225. In addition, the 1978 amendment 
inserted "other than potatoes" after "commodity" in current section 
499a(b)(6)(C). See Pub L. No. 95-562, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. (92 Stat.) 2381. 
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Moreover, requiring restaurants that purchase large 
quantities of produce to comply with PACA furthers the 
goals of the statute as amended in 1984. Although the 
original PACA was enacted to protect produce growers and 
producers, the 1984 amendments, including the trust 
provision, were enacted for the protection of all produce 
sellers and suppliers. Holding restaurant-purchasers 
responsible to produce sellers such as Bowie provides 
protection of produce suppliers up through the distribution 
chain and therefore furthers the purposes of the trust 
provision. 
 
Magic contends that if this court holds that restaurants 
are "dealers," and therefore subject to PACA, the 
repercussions would be "staggering" because"all of the 
hundreds of thousands of restaurants in this country" that 
have never applied for licenses under PACA "have been in 
direct violation of federal law, for decades." (Appellee's Br. 
at 18-19). To some extent, Magic may have a point. Under 
PACA, any person failing to obtain a license through 
inadvertence rather than wilfulness may "be permitted by 
the Secretary . . . to settle his liability in the matter by the 
payment of fees due for the period covered by such violation 
and an additional sum, not in excess of $250, to befixed by 
the Secretary . . . ." 7 U.S.C. 499c(b). Should the Secretary 
choose to pursue such violations, these licensing fees could 
add up to substantial amounts over the 70-year period in 
which PACA has been in force. 
 
It is not clear how many restaurants actually purchase 
produce in "wholesale or jobbing quantities," and are 
therefore subject to PACA's licensing requirement. The 
parties have offered no evidence on this point. We suspect, 
however, that the number of restaurants that do so is far 
smaller than Magic contends. In addition, we would be very 
surprised if the Secretary chose to pursue enforcement of 
such violations retroactively. Even if the Secretary does 
attempt to enforce PACA's penalty provisions against these 
"violating" restaurants, the long history of non-enforcement 
against restaurants in this case may be sufficiently 
extraordinary as to permit restaurants to successfully argue 
the application of equitable estoppel or laches. 
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We recognize that the USDA has refused to exercise 
jurisdiction over restaurants pursuant to PACA for 
approximately seven decades. It is this benign neglect that 
is responsible for much of the confusion in this area. 
Nevertheless, we are constrained by PACA's unambiguous 
statutory language to hold that a restaurant such as Magic, 
which purchases produce in wholesale or jobbing quantities 
(and in excess of $230,000 per year), is a "dealer" under 7 
U.S.C. S 499a(b)(6), and administrative interpretations 
contrary to this plain language are therefore not persuasive. 
 
IV. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the January 6, 1999 order of 
the district court will be reversed, and the case remanded 
to the district court with instructions to reinstate the 
January 15, 1997 order of the bankruptcy court granting 
partial summary judgment in favor of Bowie. Each side to 
bear its own costs. 
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RENDELL, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 
I respectfully dissent because I find the phrase"engaged 
in the business of buying or selling . . ." to be susceptible 
of a different meaning from that given it by the majority. 
 
Restaurants are engaged in the business of preparing 
and selling meals to customers. Not only is buying or 
selling perishables in large quantities not their primary 
business, it is not their business at all. 10 Admittedly, in the 
course of their business, they do buy perishables in great 
quantities. If PACA was intended to include them, Congress 
should have said, "any business that buys or sells . . ."; it 
did not. As I read the statute, it confines the concept of 
"dealer" to those who do this as their bread and butter, so 
to speak. The majority reading would make most prisons 
"dealers," yet prisons are not engaged in the perishable 
commodity-buying business. 
 
The reading I have proffered, together with the majority's 
rejection of it, leads me to conclude that the statutory 
language is ambiguous. Once we have found an ambiguity 
in the statutory language, our resort to legislative history 
would confirm that PACA is not intended to cover 
restaurants and food service institutions. In discussing the 
definition of "retailer" (which relies in part on the definition 
of dealer), the House Report made clear that food service 
establishments such as restaurants or schools, hospitals, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. The majority relies by analogy upon the Kelley case, which found 
that the Packers and Stockyards Act did not require a dealer to be 
engaged solely in the business of selling livestock. See Kelley v. United 
States, 202 F.2d 838 (10th Cir. 1953). This analogy is inapposite. In 
Kelley, the livestock dealer was clearly engaged in the business of 
selling 
 
livestock. Kelley was a proprietor of a stockyard that, because it was 
private, was not itself subject to the Packers and Stockyards Act. See id. 
at 839. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found that, by buying 
livestock from stockyards that were subject to the Act, Kelley became a 
"dealer" subject to the registration and bond requirements of the Act. See 
id. at 841. That is, the issue in Kelley was whether the livestock dealer 
had to be registered when his dealing in livestock subject to the Act was 
not his sole business due to the fact that his sales of other livestock 
might predominate. There is no question that the core of Kelley's 
business was dealing livestock, and this clearly distinguishes his case 
from the instant case where Magic's business is not dealing in produce. 
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and other institutional cafeterias are not required to be 
licensed. The agency's construction of PACA is consistent 
with this position.11 In short, dealers and brokers are those 
whose business is in dealing in, or brokering, these items. 
They should be licensed and are subject to the Act. Magic 
is engaged in a very different business, and is not in my 
view subject to regulation as a "dealer" under PACA. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. The majority notes that we "should not defer to an agency position 
which is contrary to an intent of Congress expressed in unambiguous 
terms." Ante at 12 (quoting Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 
U.S. 469, 476 (1992)). Here, however, the only unambiguous statement 
of Congressional intent appears in the House Report. The agency's 
position is consistent with the intent expressed in the legislative 
history. 
See In re The Italian Oven, Inc., 207 B.R. 839, 843-44 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 
1997) (describing agency position on, and legislative history of, the 
"dealer" provision of PACA). 
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